flicts among all the holders of rights to the use of water, irrespective of their source of title. Most gravely threatened by the water crisis and interagency struggles are the Indians who occupy Montana's Crow and Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservations and Wyoming's Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes of the Wind River Reservation. In order to formulate an appropriate policy for the control of water rights in the coal fields of the Yellowstone Basin it is essential to understand the development and implications of conflicting federal, state, and Indian claims.
I THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL AND WESTERN WATER LAW
In 1496 Henry VII of England commissioned John Cabot to discover and claim on behalf of His Majesty all lands not otherwise claimed or occupied by "Christian" princes. From Cabot's voyages stein the British, and later the American, claims to the lands and waters of this continent.' Confronted by powerful tribes, 5 the British Crown and other European potentates were forced to enter into treaties with the Indians. These treaties acknowledged the Indians' rights of occupancy and self-government. Among themselves the European powers recognized each other's rights to obtain the Indians' lands by purchase or conquest. 6 Similar rights were asserted by France to the lands west of the Mississippi.' Following independence, the United States reaffirmed these principles 8 and coupled them with a specific division of powers between the state and 4. In Johnson v. McIntosh, Chief Justice Marshall, reviewing this nation's laws respecting the claims to Indian lands, described as an -extravagant" pretension the proposition that by sailing down the Virginia coast Cabot had claimed for the King all the lands which came within his view. "To this discovery the English trace their title." 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 576 (1823). This claim was also recognized as preposterous by Chief Justice Story who scoffed at the idea that an alleged "discovery" of inhabited lands could serve as a basis for asserting title to it. Rather, Story recognized the claim for what it was and is-an assertion of European bias against native peoples in general. I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 152 , at 106 (5th ed. 1891). And throughout the early decades of American history, as Chancellor Kent remarked, the non-Indian settlers were "penetrated with a perfect contempt of Indian rights." 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 557, 558 n.(b) (13th ed. 1884).
As the Court stated in Johnson v. McIntosh, Great
Britain has ascertained thorough harsh experience that the Indian nations were "too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable enemies...." 21 U.S. at 596.
6. The European powers regulated rights of acquisition according to the principle that "discover), gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession." However, they did not declare that the Indian nations and tribes were totally without right to their land. 21 U.S. at 573. It was conceded-seemingly by all Europeans-that the Indians were "the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it.... " But the discoverer-nation possessed the power to extinguish that title or to recognize the Indian rights of occupancy. 21 U.S. at 574. federal governments under which the federal government was delegated the power to regulate commerce and to enter into treaties with the Indians. 9 Moreover, Congress could control the admission of new states to the Union,", pass laws regarding territories and federal properties," 1 and insure the supremacy of federal laws. 2 Despite extravagant claims based on the right of discovery, the federal goverment and its courts recognized, from the earliest years of independence, that the Indians possessed that inherent sovereign power from which stem their treaty rights-rights which the federal government in the exercise of its constitutional control over Indian affairs was bound to honor, but which it frequently violated. The principle of federal control over new territories was extended to the Louisiana Territory following its purchase from France in 1803." 3 Although
Congress did not for many years enact any laws directly relating to the waters of the Yellowstone River Basin, it was in this period that the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Marshall, began to lay down principles of treaty interpretation that continue to affect the issue of water rights in the region. Thus, in Worchester v. Georgia the Court, faced with the issue of the paramount treaty rights of the Cherokee Nation vis--vis the laws of Georgia, held that the reference to "hunting grounds" in the Cherokee treaty could not be construed as implying "that any intention existed of restricting the full use of the lands they [the Indians] reserved.' 4 The Court thus recognized that the Indians reserved to themselves that which they did not grant to the United States; hence, the particular use to which they put their lands was "a matter of no concern" to the United States.1 5 The Court further rejected the assertion that Indian rights to use reserved lands were limited to the use to which they were put at the time of the treaty. 6 These early tenets of treaty construction remain extremely important when applied to the present-day reservation of water rights and the uses to which they may be put. Almost half a century elapsed between the 1803 Louisiana Purchase and the execution of the first Indian treaty pertaining to a portion of the Yellow- 15. 31 U.S. at 553.
As the Court in
Worchester pointed out, the use of the phrase 'hunting grounds" in early treaties with the Crown did not imply "a right in the British government to take their lands, or to interfere with their internal government." Id.
stone River Basin. The Treaty of Fort Laramie, entered into on September 17, 1851, recognized the rights of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe to a broad stretch of land that includes part of the coal fields here under consideration." 7 A few years later, on May 30, 1854, Congress adopted "An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas," which covered an area embracing the present states of Montana and Wyoming and including, of course, the Yellowstone River and all its tributaries."' Congress guaranteed that nothing in the Act would "impair the right of person or property now pertaining to the Indians in said Territory, so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty between the United States and such Indians." Moreover, the Indians would not have their lands included in the territory of Nebraska without their consent. The United States remained fully empowered to exercise its authority "respecting such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights, by treaty, law, or otherwise."' 9
The Territorial Act did not refer directly to any controlling law of water rights. It was in the gold fields of California and in subsequent judicial and legislative action that water laws were formulated. At the time Mexico ceded California to the United States under the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 21 there was neither federal nor state law applicable to rights to the use of water on the vast public domain which had been acquired. To achieve order in the gold fields the miners developed their own customs, usages, and regulations, and these were to form the basis for all of western water law. In its simplest terms, these customs declared that the individual who first made use of an available water supply had a prior right over all other claimants to as much of the water as he could beneficially use. Moreover, the first user could appropriate to his own use all of the waters of a stream if he could apply it to beneficial uses. 2 1 The California legislature gave legal effect to these customs in 1851.22 Thereafter, further support for this developing doc-17. The Treaty provides that the territory of the Cheyenne and Arapahos would embrace an area commencing at a point on the north fork of the Platte River thence up the north fork of the Platte River to its source; thence along the main range of the Rocky Mountains to the head-waters of the Arkansas River; thence down the Arkansas River to the crossing of the Santa Fe road; thence in a northwesterly direction to the forks of the Platte River; and thence up the Platte River to the place of beginning. II Stat. 749 (1855); 2 C. KAPPLER which is inapplicable to lands of Indians or Indian tribes. 29 Only surplus waters on federal lands properly designated as "public lands" were open to appropriation under federal law.
As the territories of Montana and Wyoming approached statehood it was clear that water would become the basis-and the limit-of their future growth. Both territories therefore moved to assert greater control over the water resources within their boundaries and to regularize the laws governing its appropriation. Montana's Territorial Legislative Assembly enacted a primitive water code in 1865 that provided for the distribution of water "in a just and equitable proportion." 30 The territories' highest court thereafter held that with regard to the apportionment of water, "equity declares that he who is first in time is first in right," ' 3 ' and the Territorial Legislature gave formal recognition to this principle in 1885.32 The Montana statutes and cases did not, in this early period, explicitly reject the common law doctrine of riparian rights. That doctrine recognizes the principle that the owners of lands which abut upon natural streams or bodies of water have vested rights in those waters. The doctrine of riparian rights denies a landowner whose property does not abut upon a stream any right to water, irrespective of need or purpose. By contrast, the doctrine of prior appropriation authorizes the diversion and use of water to non-adjacent lands. Moreover, it assures a senior and better right to the appropriator based upon his date of priority. Beneficial use, therefore, is the basis, the measure, and the limit of the rights of the appropriator, with the first in time being the first in right. It was not until 1921 that the Supreme Court of Montana firmly rejected the common law rule of riparian rights in favor of the aioctrine of prior appropriation.
33
Where Montana was slow to formulate its laws respecting rights to the use of water or to establish centralized control over the administration and appropriations of rights, Wyoming reached the same goals more quickly and directly. From its inception, the territory of Wyoming declared its adherence to the doctrine of prior appropriation 34 and formulated administrative procedures to implement that doctrine. (1887)). However, when a claimant sought to assert rights as a riparian owner, the Wyoming court was quick to declare: "The common-law sembly went further, stating that: "The water of every natural stream not heretofore appropriated within this Territory, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people, subject to appropriation as herein provided.
'36 Montana made a similar claim in earlier statutes and has updated its practices and procedures respecting the acquisition, control, and use of the state's water resources through its revised constitutions and statutes.
3 7
At the time of their admission to the Union, both Montana and Wyoming acknowledged existing Indian rights and the plenary power of Congress to control Indian affairs. The Enabling Act of 1889 that authorized statehood for Montana (as well as North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington) provided: "That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title . . .to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian Tribes.
' 38 This disclaimer was repeated in the various western state constitutions, 3 9 including that of Wyoming.
40
In both Montana and Wyoming, therefore, the law of water rights has reached essentially the same results. The right to the use of water is regarded as a usufructory right, 41 a vested right to the corpus of water flowing in a natural stream. 42 This right to the use of water is an interest in real property and entitled to all the dignity of a freehold interest. The date of priority is in doctrine relating to the rights of a riparian proprietor in the water of a natural stream, and the use thereof is unsuited to our requirements and necessities, and never obtained in itself a valuable property, a component of that real property interest. When courts adjudicate rights to the use of water, the suits are in the nature of a proceeding to quiet title to real property. Courts do not create the rights by adjudicating them; they merely accord to them judicial cognizance. 4 4 States, in the exercise of their police power, have adopted elaborate procedures for the acquisition, administration, and adjudication of rights to the use of water. Wyoming has pioneered the way for many western states in establishing strict regulation under a board of control created by statute pursuant to its constitution.
4 5 However, such policy regulations pertain only to matters coming within the scope of state jurisdiction. They have no application to federal rights or to the rights of Indian tribes and people.
1I THE CLASH OF FEDERAL AND STATE WATER RIGHTS
The conflict between the states and the federal government over water rights involves two basic questions. First, has the federal government conveyed or delegated to the states the power to regulate the use of water on federal and Indian lands by virtue of statutes permitting appropriations according to state laws on "public lands"? And second, absent a specific delegation, to what extent may the states nevertheless exercise regulatory control over the waters that pass through lands that lie within their jurisdictions?
Despite the claims of Wyoming and Montana to all the unappropriated waters within their territories, the courts have recognized that under the Property rights in water consist not alone in the amount of the appropriation, but also in the priority of the appropriation. It often happens that the chief value of an appropriation consists in its priority over other appropriations from the same natural stream. Property and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution, Congress retains control over the public domain and navigable waters, and that within this sphere the power of the federal government is supreme. It was pursuant to these powers that with the acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase there passed to the nation, subject to the rights of the Indians, title to "all lands, lakes [and] rivers" 4 in the territory. Hence, the statutory claims of Wyoming, Montana, and other states to all the unappropriated waters within their territories have been held not to vest "in the state title or ownership of the water as a proprietor." 4 7 Rather, as the Wyoming 4 8 and Colorado
4
" courts have noted, these state statutes are an exercise of regulatory authority, not an exercise of proprietary rights. Moreover the United States Supreme Court has held that these regulatory powers are further circumscribed as they relate to federal title in the public domain. Pursuant to its constitiutional authority, said the Court, "the government possessed the power to dispose of land and water thereon together, or to dispose of them separately."
I " Under the Acts of 1866, 1870, and the Desert Land Act of 1877,-1 the federal government opened to appropriation and use of the public surplus waters on the public lands. The Court found that by this action Congress had vested in the states the power to affect the water rights of persons who took public lands by patent from the United States. Thus by action of these statutes a patent to "public land" did not carry with it rights to the use of water, as Congress had provided that those rights could only be separately acquired by compliance with "the customs, laws, and judicial decisions of the state of their location." 2 When the United States withdrew "public lands" and reserved them for federal purposes, the then existing surplus waters were no longer open to appropriation pursuant to state laws. Since the federal government is the source of the full title, it has the power to reserve the surplus waters for its own needs and those of Indians. . . 61 As the Supreme Court has noted, "the prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States. ' There is, then, an unbroken line of authority which holds that the federal government is exempt in its own jurisdiction from state regulatory controls. As Chief Justice Marshall said in McCulloch v. Maryland: "If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this-that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action." ' 6 8 In denying that a state could tax a federal agency, Marshall emphasized that the "power of taxing" the agency "may be exercised so as to destroy it."6 7 Similarly, if states had the power to veto this nation's will respecting its rights to the use of water, that authority would be tantamount to vesting in those subordinate quasi-sovereigns the power to destroy it, particularly in the arid and semi-arid West. This language from McCulloch v. Maryland leaves no doubt as to where the power resides when national interests are involved in the development of the water resources of the Yellowstone River Basin: "No trace is to be found in the constitution, of an intention to create a dependence of the government of the Union on those of the States, for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was it expected to rely for the accomplishment of its ends." 8 To allow the states of Montana or Wyoming to regulate the actions of the federal government would force the government to resort "to means which it cannot control," thus rendering "its course precarious" and its powers dependent "on other governments, which might disappoint its most important designs." Such control by the states of the nation "is incompatible with the language of the Constitution." 6 It should be emphasized, nevertheless, that where rights to the use of water have been privately acquired by compliance with the laws of the states of Montana and Wyoming they may only be taken by the federal government through the exercise of its powers of eminent domain.
III THE NATURE AND EXTENT Or INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
Although the federal government may assert against the states its control over waters on the public domain and Indian reservations, the rights of the federal government and the Indian tribes are distinct and separate. Whereas federal water rights became vested in it by purchase or conquest and the control of those rights stems from powers granted by the Constitution, Indian water rights are vested in the Indian tribes from time immemorial. These Indian rights were reserved by the tribes through the treaties signed with the federal government. The courts have drawn a clear distinction between United States and Indian water rights and have given close consideration to the scope of Indian rights. Moreover, the courts have recognized the obligation of the United States, as trustee of the Indian tribes and people, to preserve and protect the Indian rights to the use of water.
The leading case on Indian water rights is Winters v. United States." 0 The
United States, on behalf of Montana's Fort Belknap Tribe, sought to enjoin Winters and others from diverting water from the Milk River at a point above the reservation's northern boundary. The Supreme Court was asked to determine the effect of the Treaty of 185571 and of a subsequent agreement entered into between the national government and the tribe, neither of which made mention of water. In affirming the final decree enjoining the defendants, the Supreme Court held that when the Fort Belknap Indians ceded to the United States their vast domain they "had command of the lands and the waters-command of all beneficial use" whether for hunting, grazing livestock, "or agriculture and the arts of civilization." 72 Noting that "the lands [retained by the Indians] were arid and, without irrigation, were practically valueless," the Court then asked: "Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable or adequate? ' 7 3 Indicating its scepticism of affirmative answers to these questions and reiterating the accepted rule that ambiguous treaty provisions should be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians, the Court then held that "the Government is asserting the rights of the Indians."
4 This holding was consonant with the Court's decision one year earlier in a fishing rights case, in which the Court held that the treaty with the Yakima Indians "was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted. ' 7 5 This right, said the Court at that time, "was intended to be continuing against the United States and its grantees as well as against the State and its grantees.1 7 6 In subsequent years the courts have consistently upheld and applied the Winters reserved rights doctrine, the Supreme Court having specifically implemented it to define the rights of the Crow Indians to 70 " Conrad and subsequent cases have, therefore, consistently presented a caveat to all users of water in which Indians have a valid legal interest. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that Winters rights are equally applicable to reservations that were created not by treaty but by executive order. Although earlier courts in reported cases had considered only Indian rights involving treaty reservations, a 1939 court of appeals decision attempted to limit Indian water rights on an executive order reservation to historic uses.
7
" The Supreme Court, however, in Arizona v. California, without distinguishing between executive order and treaty reservations, held that the federal government could and did reserve rights to the use of water to meet present and future water requirements for Indians who were placed on executive order reservations. The Arizona v. California Court also rejected the argument that reservation needs should be fixed according to a population projection. Instead, the Court stated: "[T]he only feasible and fair way by which reserved water for the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage." 8 1 There is, however, no reason in law, logic, or equity to limit Indian rights to agriculture. Although agricultural uses predominate in the Colorado River Basin, to which the Court addressed itself in Arizona, in the coal fields of the Yellowstone River Basin industrial uses may ultimately be foremost. Earlier courts recognized the validity of multiple purpose use, 82 and it has more recently been held that Indian rights to water may be exercised for any beneficial use.
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It will be recalled, too, that in Winters the Court recognized that the Indians, prior to the advent of the white man, had control of their lands and waters for beneficial use. In Winters, the court also recognized that on the reservations the Indians could turn both "to agriculture and the arts of civilization." rights, may be enjoyed and utilized for any purpose, so long as the rights of others are not impaired. In addition to arguing that Indian reserved water rights are limited by the purposes to which they may be placed, state governments-and some federal agencies-have urged other restrictions on Indian water rights. They would, for example, limit Indian rights to waters within or bordering their reservations. The courts have consistently rejected any argument that states may authorize a user to divert waters from the tributary sources of rivers in which there are vested rights that would be impaired by such diversions.
8 6 As the Oregon Supreme Court stated: "The rights of prior appropriators from a stream cannot be impaired by subsequent appropriations of water from its tributaries." ' 8 7 These concepts have also been applied to Indian rights. Moreover, the courts have rejected the argument that failure on the part of the federal government to assert Indian water rights means that these rights have been forfeited. 8 There are, of course, many instances in which Indians were using water on their lands prior to white settlement. 8 9 Unfortunately, however, in many cases the interagency disputes"° have delayed Indian water developments. That delay, however, in the eyes of the law, does not justify a loss of Indian reserved rights. A far more serious question is rapidly emerging. The power of the federal government to apply reserved water rights on lands held in trust by the federal government for the development of national energy resources cannot be seriously questioned. What may be questioned is whether federal officials will act to protect Indian rights and to assist Indians in the exercise of those rights even as they try to implement a national energy program.
IV FEDERAL RESOURCE PROGRAMS AND INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
The present concern with developing additional energy resources for the nation has focused renewed attention on the distribution of waters in the Yellowstone River Basin. Drastic changes were, however, transpiring in regard to national and state policies in this area well in advance of the present crisis. In particular, significant alterations were occurring in the water marketing programs of the federal agencies. Careful consideration of the legality of these programs is essential to a determination of water rights within the Yellowstone system.
Beginning in 1967 the Bureau of Reclamation initiated a program for the sale to industrial users of waters from the Big Horn River. Contracts were signed which purported to effectuate the sale of approximately 625,000 acrefeet of the water from the Big Horn River and the streams impounded in Big Horn Lake, a reservoir created by the Yellowtail Dam on the Crow Indian Reservation of Montana. Two years later, a contract with Sun Oil Company purported to provide 35,000 acre-feet of Big Horn River water from the Boysen Reservoir, located on the Wind River Indian Reservation in Wyoming. (The Wind River, a major tributary of the Big Horn, rises on the Wind River Reservation.) About two-thirds of the total amount contracted for would be used by the major oil companies for the development of coal resources in Wyoming.
Authority for these contracts was sought in the Federal Reclamation Act of 19029' and in the Yellowstone River Compact. 92 These laws, however, deal with agricultural uses and acknowledge the rights of prior appropriators.
Recognizing that reclamation projects were in furtherance of agricultural the proposed project, that such use would not adversely affect irrigation projects, and that "no water shall be furnished" for non-agricultural purposes if it is detrimental "to the rights of any prior appropriator." 9 ' Moreover, the sale of project water could not be made without the consent of the water users associations that usually administer the projects. The 1920 Act must be read in the light of subsequent legislation envisioning the multiple use of water in the entire Missouri River Basin, of which the Yellowstone and Big Horn Rivers form a part. The Reclamation Project Act of 193995 authorized the sale of water from reclamation projects for municipal or miscellaneous purposes. Although the requirement for approval by the water users on the project was omitted, that power survived under the earlier acts. The 1939 Act vested in the Secretary of the Interior broad discretionary power to dispose of water from irrigation projects so long as it did not impair the efficiency of those projects. Moreover, the Secretary's powers obviously could not transcend the constitutional rights of users to be free from the seizure of vested rights without due process of law and the payment of just compensation.
Another 97 That authority, however, is subject to the condition that "no contracts for such water shall adversely affect then existing lawful uses of such water." ' 8 In the Water Supply Act of 1958 Congress further authorized the Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation to "impound water for present or anticipated future demand or need for municipal or industrial water." 9 " These statutes, however, leave crucial issues unresolved. They do not propose to authorize the seizure of Indian water rights pursuant to the national power of erinent domain. There is no suggestion in any of the acts that the rights of the Indians would be subject to infringement by those broad statutory schemes in the Reclamation Laws. Despite the multiple use provisions, it is, therefore, doubtful whether these statutes empower the Bureau of Reclamation to sell water from the Big Horn River and its tributaries in contravention of treaties or any other rights of the Indian tribes. Clearly the trust re- sponsibility of the federal government to the Indian tribes involved is not to be abrogated or diminished without specific congressional authorization to that effect and provision for just compensation for any taking of Indian rights. '--without proper authorization and compensation. Similarly, it may be argued that in the absence of any authorization to purchase their reserved water rights, the Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes have retained those rights.
Further support for the Indians' water rights is found in the Court's interpretation of the 1868 treaty rights of the Shoshone. Referring to the government's fiduciary duty to the Indians, the Supreme Court, in Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States said: "The power does not extend so far as to enable the Government 'to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation . . . for that would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of confiscation. and demanded reasonable compensation for the Yellowtail Dam site. Congress did enact "taking" legislation,"" 1 which authorized payment of just compensation for the right, title, and interest of the Crows in "lands" required for the dam. A series of subsequent court cases1 was addressed to the government's authority for taking the site, the extent of the right allegedly acquired, and the amount of just compensation owing.
The courts denied that the government held a "dominant servitude" or had "dominant control" over the Big Horn River within the Crow Reservation. Moreover, it was held that since the seizure by eminent domain of Crow property at the dam site was "for irrigation and recreation, as well as power production" ' an increased sum should be awarded over and above the amount allowed in the legislation' 1 2 authorizing a taking and compensation. In effect, then, the Crow were subjected at most only to a partial taking for specific and limited purposes. They were not subjected to a total divestiture of their property interests in their Winters rights in the Big Horn River which could justify allocation and sale of their waters by the Bureau of Reclamation. As the Supreme Court has stated: "The taking by condemnation of an interest less than a fee is familiar in the law of eminent donain."' ' 3 This is certainly applicable in the Crow case.
CONCLUSION
Nowhere are the detrimental effects of piecemeal legislation relating to Indian rights more keenly felt than in the determination of water rights. Despite federal treaties and the existence of rights affirmed under Winters, the policy and practice of violation of their rights has continued to threaten the tribes of the Yellowstone River Basin. Pending litigation'
by the northern Cheyenne and Crow tribes to protect their rights in the Tongue and Big Horn Rivers may clarify certain issues relating to these tribes.'
5 However, the ultimate determination will probably turn on the application of federal policies formed in the face of the energy crises. Moreover, the historic reluctance of the Justice and Interior Departments to advocate Indian rights continues to render the protection of Indian reserved water rights difficult.
One issue is clear: It is detrimental to all concerned to persist in formulating grandiose schemes for developing coal-related industries in the region on the basis of highly misleading water supply projections that totally disregard the present and future demands on alleged firm water supplies."
6 Federal agencies often fail to present accurately the facts concerning the highly fluctuating water supplies and the needs of those already holding title of vested rights, either Indian or non-Indian. Mistakes in these estimates have disastrous consequences for local water users who are virtually without remedies once water has been committed by powerful political forces to uses which exceed anticipated supplies.
For a period of time a moratorium was imposed by 
